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Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, most of the world's
automobile production facilities have been located in the
developed nations of Western Europe, North America, and later,
Japan. Despite some erosion of this predominance in recent
years, the mature industrial countries still produced more than
four fifths of the world's motor vehicles in 1980.
During the 1980's this historic pattern may shift substantially,
with major automobile and component production facilities being
relocated to the less developed countries of Central and South
America, and the Far East.
Obviously, these changes and the rate at which they occur will
have profound impacts on the economies of the world, both
developed and developing. To forecast the trends, and to
understand their impacts, it is necessary to review the factors
that have governed the plant siting decisions of the world's
automakers. Many of these factors have changed significantly
over the past decade, altering the calculus of corporate
decision-making.
AUTOMOBILE PLANT LOCATIONS - THE HISTORICAL PATTERN
Transportation Costs and Economies of Scale
As with any major manufacturing facility, the siting of an
automobile plant involves a balancing of the factor costs of
alternative locations. In these location decisions, the
trade-off between scale economies and transportation costs is
one of the most critical considerations. Other things being
equal, larger, more efficient plants must serve larger markets,
and will incur higher outbound transportation costs.
Historically, this trade-off has strongly influenced the
location of automobile assembly facilities, tending to disperse
them toward final markets. On the one hand, the economies of
scale for automobile assembly appear to flatten out for plants
of greater than 250,000 - 300,000 units per year.(1) On the
other, the costs of transporting finished vehicles (which by
their nature are bulky, somewhat fragile space capsules) rise
continuously with higher volumes and longer distances from the
plant.
As a result, automobile assembly facilities have generally
followed automobile markets as soon as these markets have
reached sufficient size.
The high cost of transporting assembled vehicles helps to
explain the predominance of the developed countries in the
production of automobiles. The developed countries that
produced 81% of the world's vehicles in 1980 also consumed
about 74% of those vehicles.(2) Or looked at another way, in
1978 only about 16% of the motor vehicles sold in the world
were exported beyond their region of manufacture.(3)
The worldwide distribution of automobile assembly plants
near to final markets has affected, but not so decisively
determined the locations of major component production
facilities. Of course, nearness to assembly plants reduces
component transportation costs. But the economies of scale
for production of various components tend to be greater, and their
transportation costs to be lower (proportionately) than for
finished automobiles. As a result, major component facilities
are generally much more centralized than assembly plants.
Larger scale economies are particularly important. Estimates of
minimum scale economies for various types of component fac-
ilities range from 1-2 million units per year for casting plants,
to 400,000-1,000,000 units for plants machining and assembling
engines or transmissions, to 500,000.annual units for plants
stamping body parts.(4) The differences in capital costs for
low and high volume component facilities can be substantial.
For example, an engine plant capable of producing 600,000 units
per year might cost $1000-1300 per unit of annual capacity,
compared to almost twice that for a smaller plant designed to
produce only 100,000 engines per year.
Lower proportional transportation costs also affect the equa-
tion, often making it feasible to ship major components very
long distances. For example, engines, which are relatively
compact and less vulnerable to damage in transit, can be ship-
ped from the Far East to Detroit for 3-4% of their landed cost
while transportation adds 6-8% to the cost of finished vehicles
over the same distance.(5) On the other hand, the bulkiness and
high cost of packaging stamped body parts to prevent damage in
transit tends to prevent maximum exploitation of the scale
economies possible from larger stamping plants.
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In siting a few, very large component plants to serve several
assembly markets, the balancing of scale economies and
transportation costs can become quite complex. For a plant
whose markets are broadly dispersed, inbound transportation
costs and nearness to raw materials may assume greater
importance. For example, foundries must be located very near
to major engine or transmission plants, and both will tend to
be sited near to sources of cheap iron and steel.
In evaluating the economics of very high volume component
plants, one transportation cost variable is sometimes
overlooked: the cost of long supply lines. Inevitably,
assembly plants supported by fewer, more distant component
plants are more vulnerable to surges and interruptions of
supply from strikes, poor freight service, fluctuations in
demand, or acts of God. Because of the extremely high cost of
unexpected assembly plant shut-downs, long supply lines require
higher inventories, both at the assembly plant and in the
pipeline itself. While they are hard to quantify, the costs of
these inventories, measured in interest, higher space costs,
greater damage from excessive materials handling, or
overstocking during market downturns, can be quite significant.
Quality control can also be more difficult, since defects
discovered at the point of assembly will likely exist
throughout the entire inventory, making adjustments and
corrections much more costly and time-consuming.
Other Factors
Of course, transportation costs are only one factor affecting
total unit costs at alternative sites. Labor cost and
productivity differentials, raw material and purchased parts
costs, land start-up and overhead expenses all may vary within
and between countries. Depending on the plant, these
differences in other factor costs may outweigh transportation
differentials.
Labor costs are the most often cited example. While
industry-wide contracts have sharply narrowed wage differentials
within some countries such as the United States, wide
differences in wage rates and productivity levels exist between
countries. For example, even for a highly automated process
such as the machining and assembly of engines, Japanese
producers appear to hold a significant labor cost advantage
over U.S. producers, totaling almost $100 per engine:
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Labor Costs For Engine Machining and Assembly
U.S. Japan
Direct Labor Hours per Engine 7.0 3.5
Hourly Labor Cost (1979) $19.30 $10.86
Direct Labor Cost per Engine $135.10 $38.01
Sources: Harbour and Associates,1980;
Abernathy, Harbour and Henn,
1981
Other factors besides labor may also be important. For example,
steel is typically about $.02 cheaper per pound in Japan (6) and
some developing countries than in the U.S. or Europe, while U.S.
aluminum has generally been the cheapest in the world. Land
costs tend to be lower in developing countries, while purchased
parts cost less in Japan due to high volumes and efficient
production systems.
It is important to understand that while these economic factors
are carefully weighed by firms before locating new facilities,
the final decisions are greatly influenced by the peculiar
circumstances of each firm. With their varying shares of
regional and national markets, different levels of vertical
integration, and different cost and locational structures, the
calculus of each firm is different.
Strategic considerations and the nationalistic biases of manage-
ments may play some part, as do the experiences of different
firms as they enter new markets. Firm size is also important.
Most firms holding small shares of segmented markets must serve
relatively broad regions with a few major facilities. Given the
"lumpiness" of these investments, only the very largest companies
operating in dense markets, eg., GM in the U.S., can truly seek
to optimize location efficiencies.
Perhaps most importantly, the flexibility of corporate invest-
ment planners to site new plants according to considerations of
present economic efficiency is sharply constrained by history.
No matter how large the new investment, it is usually far out-
weighed by the sunk costs already present in the production sys-
tem. A new stamping plant must serve existing assembly plants;
existing foundries may lose their economic viability if they
cannot serve new axle or transmission plants. The rigidity of
the status quo extends, of course, well beyond the firm to the
assemblage of parts and equipment suppliers and to the presence
of a large, trained labor force needed to support a major auto-
mobile production facility. The economics of new locations are
often compromised because they must incur the costs of developing
this supporting infrastructure.
Finally, political factors also tend to reinforce the status
quo. Local and state governments and local unions are likely to
oppose plant relocations within countries; national governments
and unions resist relocations across national borders. At each
investment decision point, the rigidities in the system are
substantial. This inherent locational inflexibility is
reflected in statistics on the age of auto production facilities
in mature markets. For example, the average age of GM assembly
plants in the U.S. is 39 years.(7)
Investment in Developing Countries
Beyond the general factors that have tended to discourage the
automakers from relocating existing facilities, there have been
other obstacles to the construction of automobile
plants in the developing countries. Foremost among these has
been the lack of an industrial infrastructure adequate to sup-
port major automobile plants: industries to produce low-cost,
high-quality iron, steel, aluminum, plastics and castings, and a
labor force capable of handling a full range of engineering,
management and repair tasks. In many developing countries, auto
manufacturers have found that in particular,the lack of tech-
nical experience often results in higher start-up
costs and chronic quality problems, particularly for purchased
parts.
In addition, the small size of local markets, coupled with rigid
import restrictions in many countries, has prevented the
installation of plants of minimum economic scale. With
relatively small national populations, low per capita incomes
and low levels of automobile ownership in most areas of the
world, only five countries outside of North America, Europe and
Japan had auto sales of greater than 200,000 at any time during
the 1970's. Since each of the larger developing country markets
is shared by several manufacturers, assembly plants, and
especially component facilities must be scaled far below optimum
sizes. As long as these markets are isolated by tariff, quota,
and content restrictions, larger plants cannot be supported
unless part of their production is exported back to the home
countries (potentially displacing existing capacity in the older
markets.)
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Finally, investments in automobile production facilities have
been inhibited by the perception of greater political risks.
These risks extend beyond the dangers of suddenly overthrown
governments or expropriated facilities. In most countries it is
more likely to be chronic problems with changing laws and
regulations that undermine the attractiveness of new
investments, rather than major upheavals. In policies governing
such things as import licences, local content requirements,
earnings repatriation, and ownership controls (as well as in
major macroeconomic matters such as exchange rates and fiscal
policy) laws and policies can change abruptly. For a capital
intensive industry whose facilities must be amortized over long
periods, the threat of politically induced changes that reduce
profit expectations can be a significant obstacle to investment.
(The developing countries, of course, have no monopoly on such
profit minimizing policy changes.)
The Risk-Return Trade-off
In considering new investments in developing countries, auto
manufacturers must consider not only factor costs, but these
various risk factors. Even if the costs turn out to be as
forecast, will the product be consistently delivered on time?
Will quality be adequate, especially given the long supply line
and the difficulty of correcting problems not discovered until
assembly?
For major components these risks assume tremendous importance.
Once a decision is made to source an engine or a transaxle from
one plant, there is usually no alternative. Not only are these
major components specific to a make and family of models, there
is seldom any spare capacity capable of handling the sudden
surge in demand caused by the failure of a large facility.
For this reason, most automakers have been quite cautious in
evaluating the risks of relocating major production facilities
away from traditional sources of supply. For high volume
production of basic components - stampings, large castings and
forgings, engines and axles - most automakers prefer full
operational control and low-risk locations.
This minimum risk strategy may have been reinforced by the
multiplicity of decision-makers. Typically, a decision to
locate a major new plant will require the approval not only of
local production managers and central finance and planning
staffs, but also of other production units acting as purchasing
agents for the plant's output. The several layers of
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decision-makers, each with different objectives and each holding
veto power, will tend to promote lower risk location strategies,
particularly with regard to developing countries.
This propensity toward lower risk "stay-at-home" investment
patterns may have been most characteristic of the U.S.
manufacturers, whose markets were concentrated in large,
high-profit cars that were relatively insulated from world
competition. Given the factors encouraging reinvestment at
home, the lumpiness of the investments, the evident risks of
overseas plant locations, and the reduced price and cost
pressure in the middle and upper ranges of the market, it would
not be suprising if American companies failed to pursue least
cost location strategies during the post-war period.
Whether or not such a charge is supportable, there is no doubt
that U.S. vehicles are still built almost entirely in North
America. For example, even the forthcoming Ford Erika, which is
to be powered by a Mexican built engine, will still be 88%
American made.
THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE STATUS QUO
This conventional description of the factors that have
influenced the location of automobile production facilities
underscores the powerful forces that have tended to keep
production at existing sites in the developed countries. Over
the past ten years, however, a number of counter trends have
emerged that have begun to encourage relocation of automobile
production plants from Europe and the United States to the
developing nations. Both economic and political factors have
played a part.
Economic Factors
One basic change encouraging the relocation of production
facilities has been the gradual shift of the world auto market
toward the developing nations. From 1970 to 1980 the proportion
of the world's motor vehicles sold in the developed markets
(North America, Western Europe, and Japan) dipped from 85 to
74%.(8) Forecasts of future demand suggest that this trend will
continue, with auto sales in the developed nations likely to
rise by less than 2% per year through the 1980's, while sales in
the developing world are forecast to double over the decade. By
1990, the developing countries are expected to account for one
third of all auto sales (9)
Given the importance of markets in determining production sites,
this shift in the market is likely to influence plant siting
significantly. All of the automakers recognize that they must
follow, and indeed anticipate the realignment of their markets.
As auto registrations in the developed countries reach satur-
ation levels, sales growth will stagnate and the market will
become more cyclical as replacement sales predominate. Only the
developing world offers new opportunities for growth.
Beyond the broad trends in the market, several single country
markets have emerged that can now, or will soon be able to
support world-scale production facilities. Among these, Brazil
(1980 vehicle sales of 1,012,000) Mexico (476,000) and
Argentina(1979 - 260,000) are the largest, while markets in
Taiwan, Korea, and Venezuela are smaller but growing.
In addition to the increasing absolute and relative size of
developing country markets, several of these nations have become
more attractive sites for production over the last decade. As
markets have grown during the 1970's the capabilities of the
associated supporting industries have improved. In Brazil,
Mexico, Korea and Taiwan, for example, well developed basic
metals, fabrication and foundry industries have emerged, along
with large relatively proficient labor forces with technical and
engineering skills.
This strengthening of the industrial infrastructure and the base
of human capital has narrowed the wage gap somewhat, but it has
not eliminated it. In 1979 average wages in the motor vehicle
industry in Korea were about $1.45 per hour, compared to about
$2.25 in Brazil, $4.00 in Mexico, $7.00 in Japan, and $15.00 in
the U.S. and West Germany. (10)( In part these continuing wide
differences were the result of more rapid increases in the wages
of autoworkers in the U.S. and Europe, compared to the increases
in the wages of other manufacturing workers in those regions.)
With increasing volumes and accompanying scale economies,
productivity in most developing countries has risen steadily,
narrowing the gap in output per worker and increasing the unit
labor cost advantage.
Other factor costs have also declined in some countries. For
example, Korean iron and steel, which are efficiently produced
with very low capital and labor costs per ton, have helped to
increase that country's potential advantage in the production of
cast and forged parts. Low Mexican energy costs offer a similar
potential national advantage.
Real transportation costs for both finished vehicles and parts
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appear to have declined over the past fifteen years.
Containerization, which cut handling costs, pilferage and
damage, and increased the speed and ease of inland
transshipment, has had an impact on component freight costs.
Similarly, the covered railroad auto carrier, and improvements
in the management of rail freight services have cut overland
transportation costs for vehicles. Most importantly, Japanese
innovations with specially designed, dedicated car carrying
ships have apparently reduced ocean freight charges
significantly. These improvements may open new possibilities
for shipment of vehicles or parts from developing countries to
the industrialized nations.
Finally, shifts in currency values subsequent to the advent of
floating exchange rates in the early 1970's have played a part
in the relative attractiveness of plants in developing coun-
tries. The strength of the Deutchemark has certainly played a
part in Volkswagon's worldwide investment decisions. Recipro-
cally, the relative weakness of some developing country cur-
rencies has affected their attractiveness as auto production
sites. Expectations about shifts in relative currency values are
as important as actual fluctuations. Currencies that are ex-
pected to depreciate over the medium term more rapidly than
their relative rates of inflation would predict (Taiwan might be
an example) will appear to be more attractive manufacturing
sites than those which may expect an opposite pattern (such as
oil rich Mexico).
These improvements in the relative economic advantages of some
of the developing countries may be less important, however, than
changes in the competitive conditions facing many U.S. and
European automobile manufacturing firms. As competition has
intensified in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, most of these
firms have been forced to re-evaluate the risk-return trade-off
for plants located in developing countries. Particularly for
U.S. firms, low risk, stay-at-home strategies may not be
sustainable.
The most important change in world auto markets over the past
decade has been the narrowing of the size range of vehicles in
the United States, Europe and Japan, partly eliminating the
segmentation of markets that had previously insulated some
regions from international competition. The average size of U.S.
vehicles has declined rapidly from a very heavy base, while
European vehicles have shrunk moderately, starting from a
smaller base. In Japan, car sizes have actually increased from
their earlier concentration on the smallest models. Worldwide,
automobile demand has become more homogenized near the mean - a
4-5 passenger vehicle much lighter than the American standard
and slightly smaller than the most typical European models of
the early 1970's.
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Not only does this product homogeniztion mean more competition
internationally; for most firms it has meant considerably greater
standardization of components: fewer body sizes, fewer engine
options, more interchangeable parts. This greater level of comp-
limentarity between models obviously offers firms greater flex-
ibility, and opens up new areas of cost competition as more
firms explore the limits of scale economies.
For the American companies, and to a lesser degree for the
Europeans, these changes in the auto market have meant a
tremendous telescoping of the investment cycle, with huge
proportions of existing production equipment scheduled to be
scrapped over the next few years. This has had the effect of
partly freeing investment planners from the sunk cost,
interlocking plant rigidities that historically have limited
plant location options. With virtually total retooling occurring
within a few years, and with the new, standardized models likely
to be marketed worldwide, the option to relocate production to
the developing countries has become much more feasible.
More importantly for these firms, the shift to small cars has
created new pressures to reduce costs. For both U.S. and
European companies, small cars have always been low profit cars.
Indeed, some analysts have speculated that the lightest
American models have actually been no-profit vehicles for many
years, carried only to assure a presence in that segment of the
market where many young buyers make their first purchase.
Having lost the luxury of a segmented market in which big,
high-profit cars could subsidize small low-profit models, firms
wishing to remain full line producers must find ways to make
small cars more profitable. If components or vehicles can be
manufactured more cheaply in the developing countries,
production is far more likely to be relocated to these areas in
the current intensely competitive environment.
Finally, markets in the U.S. and Europe have become much more
competitive over the past decade as a result of the export
initiative mounted by the Japanese. Not only have Japanese
exports had direct impacts on U.S. and European firms'
profitability by reducing capacity utilization,but aggressive
Japanese price leadership in the growing small car market has
also made it especially difficult for U.S and European pro-
ducers to serve that market segment from their existing pro-
duction base. Because Japanese companies have achieved superior
overall productivity levels their price leadership is likely to
continue indefinately.
To meet the Japanese challenge, firms must either adopt Japanese
production techniques in their domestic plants, move production
to Japan, or potentially, relocate facilities to the developing
countries with lower factor costs.
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Political Factors
Although economic considerations offer a partial explanation for
possible shifts of production to developing countries, political
factors may play an equal or greater role. The trade, regul-
atory, and promotional policies of the developing countries have
had great impacts on corporate location decisions.
Among these, trade policies are most important. At present, a
substantial proportion of the world market for assembled
vehicles is protected by trade barriers of one sort or another.
In the mature auto producing nations these restriction are
limited to informal quotas on Japanese imports and relatively
low tariffs.(These tariffs have been falling steadily since
1968 from 5.5% to 2.9% in the U.S., from 22% to 10.9% in the
EEC, and from 35% to 0 in Japan.) But the emerging markets of
the major developing countries are almost completely insulated
behind a wall of high tariffs, quotas, and local content
restrictions. In varying ways, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina,
Korea, Taiwan, and Venezuela - in short every new market of any
size - have all virtually excluded imports of assembled
vehicles. In addition, most have sharply limited imports of
parts, with tariffs or quotas or both.
These restrictions have generally succeeded in their intended
objectives: to attract local investment by the multinational
automakers desiring to serve the markets. Because of their
recognition of the need to establish a presence in these long
term growth markets (if not for immediate profit then for
strategic reasons) many of the multinationals have established
subsidiaries in the developing nations with larger markets.
Typically most of these facilities were initially plants to
assemble knocked-down kits of imported parts. Later, usually
in response to new host country regulations requiring higher
levels of local content, these assembly plants have been
supplemented with component plants for casting, machining and
stamping parts.
In many cases these production plants have been brought on
stream well before they were economically justified as part of
a strategy to build market share (or prevent others from
building it) and to gain manufacturing experience. Because
these facilities are often not fully utilized, or were
originally facilitized at less than optimum scales, they are
usually not cost competitive with home country sources. A
strong incentive exists to rationalize production in these
markets by integrating them with nearby markets, or by
exporting production to home countries.
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Until recently, such rationalization of production has been
inhibited in most countries by rigid local content requirements
and high tariffs on parts. These policies have frustrated man-
ufacturers who have been unable to achieve the minimum econ-
omies of scale needed to become internationally competitive,
despite local labor cost advantages. Moreover, these policies
have seldom been fully successful from the point of view of the
developing nations. While most countries have been able to
attract limited investments from many manufacturers, they have
seldom suceeded in becoming the sites of major production fa-
cilities exporting to developed countries.
In recent years, (often in response to the suggestions of the
multinational firms) a number of countries have recognized
that strict local content policies have failed to serve their
growth and export objectives. In place of these inflexible
rules, some nations, notably Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and the
Phillipines, have adopted policies that effectively allow
higher levels of imports - either of parts or finished vehicles
- in return for increased exports of equal or greater value.
These arrangements are usually effected by tariff reductions or
relaxation of local content rules or both.
The effect of these policy changes has often been dramatic.
Presented with the opportunity to rationalize production at
optimum scales, while increasing their penetration of local
markets with highly profitable incremental production from other
facilities, many firms have moved rapidly to expand investment
in countries offering such flexibility. In Mexico alone, more
than $1 billion of new outside investment in the automobile
industry is underway, with production from most of the new
facilities scheduled to be exported.
.Indeed, so successful have these arrangements proven in serving
the differing objectives of the auto manufacturers and the
developing nations, that some auto makers such a GM explicitly
plan their production facilities in order to be able to promise
host governments that they will "balance their trade" or show
net export surpluses. And several host nations have begun to
extend the principle across industries by requiring automakers
to market non-automotive manufactures or raw materials abroad,
in return for greater access to local markets.
These policies to promote exports of parts and vehicles depend
for their success on the existence of large, open markets cap-
able of absorbing the increased production. Regional rational-
ization of production in South America and the Far East has
been a first objective for most manufacturers, and much of the
export increase has been absorbed in inter-regional trade. But
with much of the American and European production base consis-
ting of high-cost plants producing soon to be obsolete parts,
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it seems likely that increasing amounts of the production from
new, large overseas plants will be exported back to the devel-
oped nations, supplanting production from facilities being
phased out. Perhaps soon the same rigidities that have locked
production in the developed countries will limit the flexibility
of firms to reduce their dependency on plants in developing
nations.
Other promotional and regulatory policies of the developing
countries also influence corporate siting decisions. Most countries
offer a variety of location incentives such as income, property
and sales tax holidays, direct export subsidies, suspensions of
duties on capital goods, and government backed loans or equity
capital. In general, while these types of financial aids can
improve the attractiveness of proposed investments (and are
typically the subject of extended negotiations between the
manufacturers and host governments) they are not nearly so
important as the opportunity to rationalize production and
expand markets through export/import trade-off regimes.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE - A FORD ENGINE PLANT
There is no single scale on which these often conflicting
economic and political factors can be balanced. Every
potential investment is different, and conditions change
rapidly: labor cost differentials narrow and then diverge;
currencies rise and fall; incentives are granted and then
retracted; even such immutables as maximum and minimum
economies of scale are sometimes revised in the light of new
evidence.
Some idea of how these various factors interact to influence
decisions may be gleaned from reviewing data and analysis
prepared by the planning staff of one major automaker, Ford
Motor Company.
In order to evaluate the relative attractiveness of alternative
plant locations, and to plan investment and marketing
strategies, Ford routinely analyses factor costs, business
conditions, and political risks in most major countries of the
world. For countries in which the company has a special
interest, detailed economic comparisons and risk evaluations
are prepared.
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Table I
Ford Engine Sourcing Alternatives
Purchase Japan Build U.S. Build Mexico
(Peugeot)
Total Investment
($millions)
U.S. (1)
Mexico (2)
$469 $1074
833
241
228
241
Landed Cost (CIF Detroit) (4) $1233
Gas 998
Diesel 1665
Average Annual Profit(millions) -
(Compared to Purchase Japan)
Time Adjusted Rate of Return -
$1235'
1062
1556
$7
1%
$834
228
606
Ex Benefits W/Benefits (3)
$1221 $821
1078 738
1487 975
$32 $227
5% 29%
(1) U.S. investment needs for all options include $228 million of
engineering, design, and vehicle modifications.
(2) Mexico investment needs for Japan and U.S. options include $241
million for small Mexican engine plant.
(3) Mexican export incentives include rights to increase imports into
Mexico (which increase Ford earnings by $.37 per dollar), and tax
reductions equal to 8% of export volume.
(4) Weighted Average of 65% gas and 35% diesel.
Source: Office of Senator Howard
Metzenbaum
(Not confirmed or denied
by Ford)
But even the most sophisticated factor cost study may not be
able to capture how critically some variables can influence
location decisions. Documents concerning an actual recent Ford
decision to build a major engine plant in Mexico (which
surfaced during Congressional Hearings on the proposed move)
illustrate how some of these factors influenced Ford.
In considering the Mexican investment, Ford weighed
four major alternatives for sourcing engines to power its
Topaz/Erika line, due to replace the Fairmont/Zephyr family in
1984. The choices were: purchasing engines from Toyo Kogyo,
building either Togyo Kogo or Peugeot designed engines in
Mexico, or building Toyo Kogyo engines in the United States.
The basic facts concerning the three main options Ford
considered are summarized in table I.
The Ford documents highlight several important aspects of the
company's decision. First, in strictly economic terms, the
landed costs (CIF Detroit) of engines procured via any of the
alternatives were almost indistinguishable. Japanese gasoline
engines were cheaper, as were Mexican produced Peugeot diesels,
but the U. S. disadvantage on a weighted average basis for all
engines was quite small. Had these numbers been determinitive,
they almost certainly would not have convinced Ford management
to accept the risks of longer supply lines, less assured
Mexican government policies, and the inevitable criticism from
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Table II
Ford Engine Sourcing Alternatives
Purchase Japan Build U.S. Build Mexico
(Peugeot)
Total Investment
($millions)
U.S. (1)
Mexico (2)
Landed Cost (CIF Detroit)(4) $1233
Gas 998
Diesel 1665
Average Annual Profit(millions) -
(Compared to Purchase Japan)
Time Adjusted Rate of Return -
(Compared to Purchase Japan)
$1235
1062
1556
$7
1%
Ex Benefits
$1221
1078
1487
$32
5%
W/Benefits(3)
$821
738
975
$227
29%
(1) U.S. investment needs for all options include $228 million of
engineering, design, and vehicle modifications.
(2) Mexico investment needs for Japan and U.S. options include $241
million for small Mexican engine plant.
(3) Mexican export incentives include rights to increase imports into
Mexico (which increase Ford earnings by $.37 per dollar), and tax
reductions equal to 8% of export volume.
(4) Weighted Average of 65% gas and 35% deisel.
Source: Office of Senator Howard
Metzenbaum
$469
228
241
$1074
833
241
$834
228
606
U.S. politicians and union leaders.
But after the Mexican export advantages were added to the
calculation, the Mexican plant became compellingly attractive,
with a rate of return of 29% on incremental investment,, an
incremental profit of $400 per engine over the life of the
facility, and a landed cost advantage of more than $ 400 per
unit.
It is important to note that most of the export incentives in
this case were not direct subsidies, but simply relief from
artificial quota restrictions that were preventing Ford from
fully exploiting its existing North American production base.
Four fifths of the additional profit cam from exemptions from
the Mexican quota rules that allowed Ford to import additional
North American production into Mexico, at a profit of $.37 per
dollar of sales.
Moreover, even before the export incentives were considered,
Mexican government policies had already skewed the Ford
analysis, by adding $241 million (the cost of a small engine
plant to serve the Mexican market) to the estimated capital
cost of either buying Japanese engines or building them in the
U. S. In effect, the rate of return on either U.S. investment
or Japanese purchase was artificially reduced by Mexican
government policies that prevented the most efficient
organization of Ford's engine production.
At least in this case, the Ford decision to move a major plant
out of the United States was more the result of Mexican policies
and economic considerations internal to Ford's operations (ie.,
excess production capacity in the U.S. capable of supplying the
Mexican market very profitably) than of any significant factor
cost advantage enjoyed by Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS
Although it would be idle to generalize broadly from the Ford
example, it does raise some interesting questions and suggest
some possible conclusions.
First, in light of the conflicting evidence, do the developing
countries now enjoy a true economic advantage for the
production of automobiles or components? More importantly,
what is the trend in factor costs - are these countries
becoming more or less attractive as locations from automobile
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manufacturing? Put in another context, is the relocation of
production to sites in the developing world a potential
competitive response by U.S. or European manufacturers to the
Japanese challenge, or should these manufacturers try instead
to adopt Japanese production systems at home (or simply shift
production to Japan)?
At least at present it does not appear that economic factors
favor most of the developing countries as locations for auto
production.
The one factor in which the developing countries hold a clear
advantage - labor cost - appears to be a declining fraction of
total unit costs for vehicles and most major components.
For the most efficient Japanese automakers, labor costs
represent only 15% of unit costs, and the percentage appears
likely to decline further. For some components labor is even
less important. Japanese engines are manufactured with only
3.5 hours or $40 of labor each - less than 5% of total costs,
and less, even, than the cost of freight from Japan to Europe.
For the production of major components, and increasingly for
vehicle assembly, capital - in the form of R&D, design,
engineering, and tooling - is the most important factor. Since
the developing countries are disadvantaged in these resources,
it does not appear that automobile production will be driven by
economic factors to the developing world, except in response
to the gradual shift of the world auto market.
If economic factors are not yet driving investment toward the
developing countries, are political factors more important?
More concretely, is the interaction of the economic objectives
of the developing nations (to maximize local production and
employment) and the goals of the multinational automakers (to
maximize profits by expanding markets and rationalizing
production into units of greater efficiency) likely to produce
a substantial realignment of production over the next decade?
For such a pattern to develop, the developed countries of North
America and Europe must remain willing to absorb substantial
trade deficits in automobiles and parts, while Japan and some
developing countries show growing surpluses. The current
debate has focussed almost exclusively on Japan and the trade
in assembled vehicles, but the issues in the future may shift to
parts and the local content rules of the developing countries,
if production shifts rapidly out of the mature economies. Pol-
itical pressures for universal local content rules could de-
velop, as a "solution" to both Japanese imports and off-shore
sourcing. Should such regimes win support, firms that had moved
aggressively to source components in the developing countries or
in Japan could be vulnerable. More basically the whole fabric of
trade could be affected if a system of trade balanced firm by
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firm and "content for content" began to develop.
Whether or not such restrictions are adopted, the impacts of
realignments of auto production on the economies of the
developed and developing nations, and on the fortunes of
various firms, deserve more careful review. Will governments
striving to maximize their shares of auto manufacturing
employment find that they are chasing a vanishing rainbow, as
the share of value-addded to automobiles by manufacturing labor
shrinks? Will firms, seeking to respond to highly efficient,
capital intensive Japanese production systems by chasing lower
factor costs, find that the advantages of developing countries
are soon nullified by home country trade restrictions or by
elimination of host country trade subsidies?
The magnitude and timing of the shift of automobile production
to the developing world is highly uncertain, because the
changes appear to depend more on political than economic
factors. The welfare implications of the changes, both for
firms and nations, deserve more careful analysis before policy
makers begin to fashion responses.
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